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With All Deliberate Speed:
Brown H and Desegregation's Children
Only the crassest of societies would deny a fundamental
commitment to the well-being of children and future generations.' In
harmony with what is almost surely a universal desire for
intergenerational justice, the people of the United States have
dedicated their Constitution to the task of "secur[ing] the Blessings
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."
Nominally steadfast
commitments, however, dissolve easily within the context of a
constitution "intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently,
to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." Neither law
nor "[g]eology knows [any] such word as forever." Among the few
duties that have held fast within a constitutional tradition that
asserts its obligation to reject "anew... ideas and aspirations" not fit
to "survive more ages than one"' is the nominal commitment of
American society to "the upbringing and education of children."6
"The American people," said the Supreme Court in 1923, "have
always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters
of supreme importance which should be diligently promoted."7
As though they were inspired by their state's lofty motto, ad
astra per aspera,s the members of one family in Topeka, Kansas, put
this nominal commitment to education and intergenerational justice
to a test like none other seen before or since in American history. In
what was quite possibly "the most important decision in [its]

1. See generally, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, To Our Children's
Children:The Problems of IntergenerationalEthics, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
(discussing the problems of intergenerational ethics).
2. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
3. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819)
omitted). See generally William E. Scheuerman, Constitutionalism in
Speed, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 353 (2002) (assessing the impact of societal
constitutional theory).

Children's
163 (2001)

(emphasis
an Age of
change on

4. WALLACE STEGNER, MORMON COUNTRY 48 (U. Neb. Press 1981) (1942).

5. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992).
6. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
7. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
8. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 73-2403(a) (2002). The literal translation of "ad astra per
aspera" is "to the stars through difficulties."
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history," the Supreme Court declared that "education is perhaps the
most important function of state and local governments." 10
Notwithstanding the Court's earlier pronouncements on education,
the original 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education" (Brown I)
represented a crucial turning point in American law's treatment of
schooling and its impact on children. Though the Supreme Court's
1954 desegregation decision is justly known for its stirring rejection
of racial segregation by law,2 Brown I also represents the first time
that the Supreme Court acknowledged the singular importance of
public involvement in education and the correlative "importance of
education to our democratic society:"
[Education] is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities ....It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening
the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to
his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education.13
What had begun as one family's seemingly modest effort to eliminate
its daughter's treacherous one-mile walk through a railroad
switchyard between home and a segregated public school" sparked a
forty-year battle for educational justice"5 that illustrates, as perhaps
nothing else ever could, the slow but relentless progress of the
American people through hardship to the stars.
Brown I, however, did not direct a remedy for the constitutional
injury suffered by students in segregated schools. The following
Term, the Supreme Court revisited the remedial issue in a second

9. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 286 (1993); cf.Jack

M. Balkin, Brown v. Board of Education-A CriticalIntroduction,in WHAT BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS
REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 3, 4 (Jack M. Balkin ed.,

2001) (describing Brown I as "the single most honored opinion in the Supreme Court's
corpus").
10. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12. See id. at 495 ("We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine
of'separate but equal' has no place.").
13. Id. at 493.
14. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 408-09 (1975).

15. See generally Paul E. Wilson, Ad Astra Per Aspera: Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka, 68 UMKC L. REV. 623 (2000) (describing the decades of
litigation that began with Oliver Brown's suit against the Topeka Board of Education
and ended with the July 25, 1994, approval of a desegregation plan submitted by
Unified School District #501 of Topeka).
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case styled Brown v. Board of Education16 (Brown II). Even as it
directed school districts to "make a prompt and reasonable start
toward full compliance with" Brown Fs stirring vision of equal
protection, Brown II declared "that additional time [may be]
necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner.""v The
Court thereupon remanded the desegregation cases to the lower
courts where they first arose, with instructions to "take such
proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this
opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a
racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties
to these cases."'"
The infamous "all deliberate speed" formula and the South's
massive resistance to desegregation arguably dissipated much of
Brown /s promise. At a minimum, Brown ITs "all deliberate speed'
formula enabled public school districts in the South to delay
desegregation for more than a decade. Nine years after Brown 11, an
exasperated Supreme Court finally declared that "[t]he time for mere
'deliberate speed' has run out."' 9 In 1968, a unanimous Court
declared again that "[the time for mere 'deliberate speed'" had
expired and accordingly placed the legal burden on school officials "to
come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and
promises realistically to work now."' Desegregation did not begin in
earnest, however, until the passage of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965.2k As late as 1969, the Court found
it necessary to admonish lower federal courts and local school
officials that "continued operation of segregated schools under a
standard of allowing 'all deliberate speed' for desegregation is no
longer constitutionally permissible."2 2 Seventeen years-enough time
for a first-grader at the time of Brown to earn a college
degree-elapsed before: the Court finally endorsed aggressive
remedies such as busing.2
"Racial attitudes ingrained in our
Nation's childhood and adolescence," in retrospect, could not be and
were "not quickly thrown aside in its middle years. " '
The

16. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
17. Id. at 300.
18. Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
19. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964).
20. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438-39 (1968) (emphasis in original).
21. Elementary & Secondary Education Act, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
22. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (percuriam);
accord, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449,497 n.4 (1979).
23. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
24. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 814 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tumultuous history of the desegregation agenda exposed "all
deliberate speed' as little more than "a soft euphemism for delay."25
Twenty years after Brown I, roughly half the time that the
desegregation agenda would dominate before the trilogy of Board of
Education v. Dowell, 6 Freeman v. Pitts, 7 and the final phase of
Missouri v. Jenkins28 brought an effective end to the Brown era,29 the
Supreme Court dealt desegregation a nearly fatal blow. In the 1974
case of Milliken v. Bradley,30 the Justices refused to sanction
interdistrict remedies absent a showing 'that there has been a
constitutional violation within one district that produces a
significant segregative effect in another district," a demonstration
"that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts,
or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of
interdistrict segregation."
Not without reason is Milliken derided
as "the case that effectively repudiated Brown's integrationist
mandate.'0 ' Almost contemporaneously with Milliken, the Supreme
Court refused in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez33 to treat inequalities in public school financing as a
violation of the equal protection clause. Virtually all of the public
school litigation of the last three decades can be described as one
strategem or another to work around Milliken, Rodriguez, or both.34
Half a century later, Brown IIs contested legacy endures.
Many of the social ills that continue to plague the contemporary
United States-residential segregation, disparities in achievement
and opportunity, the concentration of poverty and other social
pathologies in inner cities-can be traced to the imperfect
implementation of the Supreme Court's desegregation orders. By

25. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 1218, 1219 (1969) (Black,
Circuit Justice).
26. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
27. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
28. 515 U.S. 70 (1995); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990); Missouri
v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989).
29. See generally PETER IRONS, JIM CROW'S CHILDREN: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF
THE BROWN DECISION 259-88 (2002).
30. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
31. Id. at 745.
32. Richard Thompson Ford, Brown's Ghost, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1312
(2004).
33. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
34. For exemplary works of scholarship describing this litigation, see Molly S.
McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration of the
Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334 (2004); James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race
in School Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L. REV. 432 (1999); James E. Ryan, Schools,
Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249 (1999); James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and
School FinanceLitigation,74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 529 (1999).
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the same token, today's political and legal order is committed, as no
previous generation of Americans has ever been, to Brown rs vision
of education as an essential component of intergenerational justice.
Our schools are not only the primary vehicle for transmitting "the
values on which our society rests,"' but also "a most vital civic
institution for the preservation of a democratic system of
government." 6
The responsibility for effecting justice and
transmitting wisdom across generational lines falls squarely upon
the adults who have lived and contested the tumultuous life of the
Republic under Brown.
"Children, after all, have no past
whatsoever.
That alone accounts for the mystery of charmed
innocence in their smiles." 7 By contrast, legal scholars bear a
special moral obligation to undo the "enduring disability" that has
been inflicted on generations of children38 by the failure to fulfill
Brown Ts promise that full educational opportunity would "be made
available to all on equal terms." 9
On May 5, 2005, as part of University of Minnesota president
Robert Bruininks' "Initiative on Children, Youth, and Families,"' the
University of Minnesota Law School hosted a conference called
'"With All Deliberate Speed: Brown 11 and Desegregation's Children."
Professor emeritus John J. Cound, whose very first assignment in
the Department of Justice consisted of briefing the question of
whether federal courts, in construing the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution, had the power '"to abolish segregation in public
schools," 1 shared hosting duties with Dean Alex M. Johnson, Jr.,
and Jim Chen, both of whom are products of public schools directly
affected by the Brown litigation." A distinguished group of leading

35. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979).
36. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) ("[Elducation
prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society.").
37. MILAN KUNDERA, THE BOOK OF LAUGHTER AND FORGETTING 187 (Michael
Henry Heim trans., 1980).
38. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982); accord Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 331 (2003).
39. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
40. See http://www.cyfc.umn.edu.
41. John J. Cound, A Very New Lawyer's First Case:Brown v. Board of Education,
15 CONST. COMMENT. 57, 58 (1998).
42. Alex Johnson spent all thirteen years from kindergarten to high school
graduation in predominantly black schools within the Los Angeles Unified School
District. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Brown's Ambiguous Promise (Sept. 9, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Jim Chen divided his time between
predominantly black public schools in Atlanta and historically white public schools in
DeKalb County, Georgia. See Jim Chen, Mayteenth, 89 MINN. L. REV. 203, 203 n.',
222-25 (2004).
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scholars-Michelle Adams, Trina Jones, Goodwin Liu, Myron
Orfield, Thomas Pettigrew, James E. Pfander, and Gerald N.
Rosenberg-gathered under the Law School's aegis to address
Brown 11 and its legacy. The Law School was also delighted to
welcome a legendary figure of the struggle for civil rights, Julian
Bond.
This issue of Law & Inequality publishes the proceedings of the
University of Minnesota Law School's conference, 'With All
Deliberate Speed: Brown II and Desegregation's Children." Trina
Jones describes the lessons of Brown I and Brown 11 and their
applicability to current inequality and civil rights issues.43
Extending a theme he first developed in The Hollow Hope: Can
Courts Bring About Social Change?,44 Gerald Rosenberg questions
whether Brown 11 had any impact on a desegregation agenda
already mortally wounded by the political and cultural opposition of
most Southern Whites, and the unwillingness of federal officials to
challenge them.45 James Pfander strikes an optimistic note in
finding "some reason to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Brown 11
even as we remain sober-minded about the costs of remedial
thinness to generations of schoolchildren." 6 Finally, Goodwin Liu
explores how school desegregation and school finance litigation
diverged,4 7 even though their doctrinal underpinnings nearly
converged in the 1973 decisions of Keyes v. School DistrictNo. 148 and
San Antonio Independent School Districtv. Rodriguez.49
As with all other roads to justice, the long, imperfect, and
incomplete path of the law in Brown I and Brown II raises pragmatic
questions "of how to promote a flourishing society," questions that
should "be answered as much by experience [as by] theory."' This
dedication to asking hard, practical questions unites the diverse
contributions to this symposium. It is one thing to assert the "settled
and invariable principle... that every right, when withheld, must
43. Trina Jones, Recovering from Disappointed Expectations: The Lessons of
Brown II, 24 LAW & INEQ. 9 (2006).
44. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
45. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Tilting at Windmills: Brown II and the Hopeless Quest
to Resolve Deep-Seated Social Conflict Through Litigation, 24 LAW & INEQ. 31 (2005).
46. James E. Pfander, Brown II: OrdinaryRemedies for ExtraordinaryWrongs,
24 LAW & INEQ. 47, 55 (2006).
47. See Goodwin Liu, The Parted Paths of School Desegregation and School
Finance Litigation,24 LAW & INEQ. 81 (2006).
48. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
49. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
50. Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatismand the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV.
1331, 1347 (1988).
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have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress."5' It is another
thing altogether, especially within "the untidy crucible of American
public schools,5' 2 to address the precise terms by which Brown II
remedied the scar of official racism "with all deliberate speed." In
other words, whereas "Brown I gave us an enduring symbol" of equal
justice, "Brown II began to address matters of substance. ' 3 In the
pages that follow, the participants in this conference on Brown 11
and desegregation's children will likewise "sing of that second
kingdom / in which the human spirit is made clean / and becomes
worthy to ascend to Heaven." 4
- Jim Chen*

51. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
52. Liu, supra note 47, at 81.
53. Id.
54. DANTE ALIGHIERI, PURGATORIO: A NEW VERSE TRANSLATION 2 (W.S. Merwin
trans., 2000) (canto 1,11. 4-6); see also id. at 1 ("e canterb di quel secondo regno / dove
l'umano spirito si purga / e di salire al ciel diventa degno").
"Associate Dean for Faculty and James L. Krusemark Professor
of Law,
University of Minnesota Law School.

